Russia and the US have returned to diplomatic stalemate on Syria, proving that even when agreement in principle has been reached, such agreement is far from any guarantee of implementation. Russia saw in Syria an opportunity to act decisively, and took it. Both theories are simplistic. 40,000 fleeing Aleppo as battle for Syrian city intensifies: U.N. strategic center of Russia's military operation, Russia is still a force to be reckoned with, bloodiest Europe has seen since the wars over the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. Middle East What does Russia want from its campaign in Syria? These debates are often politically significant, but tend to be quite divisive and do not contribute much to understanding the background, broader context or consequences of the Russian operation. Russia is not building an empire, it seeks to stop one that threatens its existence from reaching its borders with proxies that include Neo-Nazis, terrorists, and NATO forces themselves. Russian leaders seem to fear … In this regard, Russia’s actions towards Syrian crisis speak volumes, providing significant amount of food for thought for those trying to understand Russian foreign policy. What Russia wants and what it will get in Syria. The opposition, though very dependent on Turkish protection, holds much of the north-west, and it also – for now – controls territor… RUSSIAN LEVERAGE. Scott Lucas, University of Birmingham Among those glancing at Syria’s seven-year conflict, a simple but misleading declaration is circulating: “Assad is winning”. They shouldn’t have. Syria gives Moscow an opportunity for affirming great power status by exerting influence beyond Russia’s near abroad. What Russian leaders seem to want in Syria is a war without EU sanctions, which they can win for the viewers at home. Middle Eastern affairs are in a state of constant flux, and grow even more so every year. This task has two dimensions: one of them is military, and the other is political. American pundits and politicians, especially Republicans, during the last month have often mentioned that the Russian military campaign represents Moscow’s return to the Middle East. What does Russia seek in Syria? Both theories are simplistic. What else does Russia want in Syria? Russia wants to fight the conflict in Syria on its own terms, which are at odds with those of the US. Russia has significant economic and military interests in Syria, such as a Mediterranean naval base at Tartus, that it is determined to keep. Russia’s ambassador in Geneva, Alexei Borodavkin, has called such demands absurd. And by demonstrating this kind of boldness Moscow, whatever its goals, forces other players in the Middle East to react—whether or not they are ready. Russian leaders support a peace deal with broad consensus among Syria's moderate factions that would allow Assad to remain in power. It included the lessons of its and other countries’ foreign military campaigns that went wrong. Chaos in the Middle East impact Russia long before in affects the United States. By demonstrating boldness, Moscow is forcing the rest of the Middle East to act decisively. It seems that there could be a more promising analytical approach. But separatist groups do continue to inflict violence on Russia, like the. Yes, Russia does sell lot of arms -- $15 billion worth in 2012 . The first thing to note here is a more consistent effort by Russia to make the operation in Syria transparent. The most important of them is that Moscow is not afraid of making bold decisions. By winning the war in Syria, Russia seeks to make the old normal the new one. Russia's president stood before the general assembly sounding ready to lead peace efforts in Syria. Syria's complex and devastating civil war has drawn in multiple foreign powers since it broke out in 2011. It has called for an international coalition to destroy them. Despite its extremely militaristic rhetoric, Russia too wanted to avoid a large-scale offensive and most importantly, a potential military confrontation with Turkey. Russia’s ambassador in Geneva, Alexei Borodavkin, has called such demands absurd. After months of heightened tensions in the Syrian province of Idlib, the last stronghold of the Syrian opposition, Russia and Turkey seem to have reached a temporary solution. The next crucial issue to follow, while analyzing the Syrian intervention’s significance for Russia’s foreign policy, is Moscow’s capability to account for past negative experience, whether its own or that of others. Thirdly, Russia wants to return as a full-fledged player in the Mediterranean basin through Syria. Even some American pundits have noticed that Obama’s decision to send fifty U.S. special forces to Syria could be considered a response to Russia’s actions. The opposition wants Assad, who has ruled Syria for 17 years, to relinquish power. Since Russia came to President Bashar al-Assad's aid at his request, the Syrian battlefield has transformed rapidly. Of course, there are enough critics speculating that not all Russian cruise missiles reached their targets. But no military or technology is perfect, and so far nobody can prove how many missiles failed. Experts can spend years studying doctrines of foreign policy and speeches of decision makers, yet remain unable to decipher how the country in question would act in various circumstances. One may argue that the decision to intervene in Syria was too risky, but in the current age of global public scrutiny, information overload and universal political procrastination, in the fast-changing and perplexing environment of the Middle East the Kremlin made a bold choice for action. In the years since, this has paid off both internationally and domestically. Soon, the world will have more evidence by which to judge Russia’s readiness for this type of fight. Here are five key reasons Russia won't be leaving Syria any time soon. Islamist rebels from the southern Russian republic of Chechnya have been fighting for independence since the 1990s, although a brutal six-year campaign by Moscow silenced much opposition and the autonomous region is now firmly under the control of Russian-appointed leader Ramzan Kadyrov. It seeks what all other nations seek and are entitled to, self-preservation. In 2000, Vladimir Putin became president of Russia and Bashar al-Assad became president of Syria. The usual explanations are that Syria buys lots of Russian arms and that the Syrian port of Tartus is an important "base" for Russia's Mediterranean Fleet. Not that Russia has used military threats as foreign policy instrument, but from time to time, one could hear critics asking: why exactly Russia should be regarded as a main power? Russia is already one of the world's biggest arms producers. Russia is not building an empire, it seeks to stop one that threatens its existence from reaching its borders with proxies that include Neo-Nazis, terrorists, and NATO forces themselves. Second, military involvement in Syria is a very serious test for Russia’s ties in the region. Russian leaders seem to fear … In this regard, Russia’s decision to stand with its ally is especially important. Here are five key reasons Russia won’t be leaving Syria any time soon. With the United States voluntarily giving up much of its leverage in Syria, Russia has probably the most to gain. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his aides have been bolstering their support of Syria’s president, Bashar Assad, for months — visibly, with troops and aircraft, and volubly as well. First of all, Syria is considered Russia’s ally in the Middle East: President Assad asked Moscow for help, and Russia has stood by its ally in very difficult circumstances. According to these statements, Moscow has been absent in the area since Anwar Sadat switched Egypt’s loyalty from the Soviet Union to the United States. Throughout the Syrian civil war, Russia … What does Russia seek in Syria? It is now entirely dependent on them. Moscow (CNN)It was the largest city in Syria before the war, and for years has been a main rebel stronghold. At the same time, the Russian government has presented the operation in Syria as an opportunity to test and promote Russian weaponry (something other large arms exporters, like … Whether one thinks that Russia is rescuing Assad, which tends to be the Western perception, or fighting ISIS, several things are very difficult to argue with. Russia’s airstrikes against Syrian rebels last week came as a surprise to many Americans — including, it seems, many in the Obama administration. It is far from the truth. Kremlin concerns about the spread of Islamist violence are genuine. Russia fears an ISIS victory in Syria would have reverberations at home, as some of the top military commanders of ISIS are Russian speakers of Chechen origin. What does Russia really want? Similar reasons might be behind the current consistent consultations with Middle Eastern powers, and invitations by the Russian defense ministry to military attachés in Moscow and Western brass, especially American, to create communication channels to avoid accidents. Battle hardened jihadists pose a greater danger to the nearby Russia than the United States. It seeks what all other nations seek and are entitled to, self-preservation. Russia is not returning to the Middle East: Syria was a Soviet ally during the Cold War and so it was very logical for Bashar al-Assad to ask for Russia’s help. Syria’s Cold War patron, Russia wants to maintain influence over Damascus once the war winds down, to keep a strategic foothold in the Mideast and a stable client for Russian weapons and commodities — and to warn the U.S. and its allies against future interference. But as we have shown above, some important facts of Russia’s behavior in the international arena are already obvious during its military campaign in Syria. Today the United States is struggling to understand who are “mainstream rebels” and who is in the “democratic opposition” in Syria, not to mention whether to provide the “good guys” with the most sophisticated weapons. The Israeli government’s greatest fear is a dramatic regional escalation, and the possibility that Syria will become a theatre of open conflict between Russia and states like the US, UK and France. But Syria hasn't been among its big customers; China, India, Algeria and Vietnam have. This situation gives regional leaders something to think about. STEVE INSKEEP, HOST: Remember, Putin is the aggressive leader recently isolated by the West. Russia is not building an empire, it seeks to stop one that threatens its existence from reaching its borders with proxies that include Neo-Nazis, terrorists, and NATO forces themselves. What Russian leaders seem to want in Syria is a war without EU sanctions, which they can win for the viewers at home. Even the 2008 operation in Georgia was close to its borders and fought against a well-known enemy. It is also important to consider that Russia used these missiles, almost routinely, not during an existential battle or a fight for vital national interests, but in a faraway campaign of choice. According to the Moscow Times these were already worth around 20 billion USD in 2011, and it is a number certain to rise in the future. RUSSIAN LEVERAGE. After months of heightened tensions in the Syrian province of Idlib, the last stronghold of the Syrian opposition, Russia and Turkey seem to have reached a temporary solution. Russia has been the target of repeated brutal terrorist attacks carried out by jihadist rebels. Russia’s airstrikes against Syrian rebels last week came as a surprise to many Americans — including, it seems, many in the Obama administration. Again, from this perspective, it seems to be a very serious move. Aleppo is the regime's most prized target and such regime gains would have been unimaginable for before. The goal in Syria was not to grab what was left but to flex its muscle and showcase power. That has not been the case with Syria, where Russia is conducting a type of campaign lately seen executed only by the United States or under American leadership. More importantly, for the Soviet Union, the Afghan war became a full-blown proxy war against the United States, Pakistan and the Gulf states, which provided crucial support to the Afghan opposition. Updated 1649 GMT (0049 HKT) February 8, 2016. Moscow’s courage includes its military capabilities and its readiness to use them. Some hawks charge that Putin's decision looks like a campaign to make Russia a major military power in the entire Middle East. Here we can again compare the Russian and American positions: for example, it is rather hard for Washington to deal with many issues in the region without talking to Tehran—yet the latter is difficult in terms of domestic U.S. politics.

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